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The roundtable discussion, Special Counsel Investigations and
Legal Ethics, of which this essay is a component, could hardly have
raised a more urgent issue for American public life in our time. On
May 17, 2017, only four months into the presidency of Donald
Trump, and shortly after President Trump's dismissal of F.B.I. Di-
rector James Comey created a crisis of confidence in the ability of
* Bruce Ledewitz is a Professor of Law at Duquesne University School of Law. My
thanks to my colleague, Jane Moriarty, for the opportunity to participate in this roundtable
with such a knowledgeable cast.
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the Justice Department to investigate, fully and fairly, alleged col-
lusion between the Trump campaign and Russian officials prior to
the 2016 election, the Justice Department appointed Robert
Mueller III as Special Counsel to conduct the investigation.1
This action did not alleviate the political crisis, which has contin-
ued in various manifestations to the time I am writing this essay in
Spring 2019. Although in public statements at the time, President
Trump evinced no criticism of Mueller's appointment-he insisted
that a thorough investigation would show that no collusion occurred
and urged that the matter be speedily concluded2 -the President
grew increasingly critical of the Mueller investigation as time
passed. On August 1, 2018, for example, President Trump, through
a tweet on Twitter, urged Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who had
recused himself from overseeing the Russia investigation, to "stop
this Rigged Witch Hunt right now."3
It is not my purpose in this paper to recount all the political vi-
cissitudes of the Mueller investigation. Nor is it my purpose to con-
clude anything at all about possible wrongdoing by President
Trump. Instead, my goal is to evaluate the different approaches
that might be taken with regard to investigating alleged wrongdo-
ing by a President. Which of the various models we can realistically
imagine is best for that purpose? My effort can be viewed as an
update of, and further engagement with, a similar investigation by
Thomas W. Merrill in 1999, on the occasion of the then-looming ex-
piration of the Independent Counsel Act.4 How has today's toxic
political environment impacted the question that he addressed?
Of course, wrongdoing by high Executive Branch officials other
than the President occurs, but my focus is on investigation of a Pres-
ident, both because that is the current pressing issue, and because
that is the perennial pressing issue. Investigations of a President
will also involve other potential targets, but they are considered
here only in the context of the quest for truth about possible presi-
dential wrongdoing.
1. See generally Rebecca R. Ruiz & Mark Landler, Robert Mueller, Former F.B.I. Direc-




3. Julie Hirschfeld Davis et al., Trump Tells Sessions to 'Stop This Rigged Witch Hunt
Right Now, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 1, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/01/us/politics/
trump-sessions-russia-investigation.html (quoting Donald J. Trump (@realDONALD-
TRUMP), TWITTER (Aug. 1, 2018, 6:24 AM), https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/10 2
4646945640525826).
4. Thomas W. Merrill, Beyond the Independent Counsel: Evaluating the Options, 43 ST.
Louis U. L.J. 1047 (1999).
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The question of which approach is best invites, in turn, two con-
siderations before any analysis can be attempted. First, what are
the realistically possible models of investigating a President?
We can determine potential models of investigation by looking at
the actual events concerning presidential wrongdoing in American
history. Although there have been numerous scandals that re-
flected upon, and perhaps implicated, Presidents-from scandals in
the administration of President Ulysses S. Grant to the Teapot
Dome Scandal in 1921 during the administration of Warren Har-
ding5 _I will concentrate in this essay on more recent presidential
scandals. My focus is upon the structural lessons to be learned from
the three most recent and well-known investigations-Watergate,
Whitewater and its later transformations, and the current Russia
collusion investigation.
6
Part I of the essay describes five models of investigation that were
utilized in various forms during these episodes. Those five models
are: (1) statutorily independent investigation-the Independent
Counsel Model; (2) administratively independent investigation-
the Special Counsel Model; (3) ad hoc investigation-the Ad Hoc
Special Prosecutor Model; (4) ordinary criminal investigation-the
U.S. Attorney Model; and (5) congressional investigation-the Leg-
islative Branch Model. All of these models have been utilized to
greater or lesser extents in the three most recent and well-known
investigations.
In addition to these approaches, variations of a sixth model that
has been proposed, but never implemented, in investigation of a
President will be considered. We can call this model the Permanent
Executive Branch Office Model because it involves the creation or
utilization of permanent structures within the Executive Branch.7
The second consideration that is raised by the title of this essay
is, what does "best" mean in a context of an investigation of presi-
dential wrongdoing? I take that matter up in Part II, which con-
cludes that the most important role for such investigation is to al-
low the people, through their representatives in Congress, to decide
5. See generally LATON MCCARTNEY, THE TEAPOT DOME SCANDAL: How BIG OIL
BOUGHT THE HARDING WHITE HOUSE AND TRIED TO STEAL THE COUNTRY (2008); see also John
M. Kelly & Janet P. McEntee, Note, The Independent Counsel Law: Is There Life After Death?,
8 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 561, 561 n.2 (1993).
6. I mostly leave out, because it did not focus originally on the actions of the President,
Independent Counsel Larry Walsh's seven-year investigation of the Iran-contra affair.
7. One model I leave out entirely is the Civil Damages Action Model, which was upheld
in Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681 (1997). That model only applies to so-called private acts of
wrongdoing by a President, which in practice means acts performed prior to a person becom-
ing President. See id. Once in office, the President is shielded from damage actions by an
absolute immunity for any official action. See Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 749 (1982).
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whether wrongdoing by a President warrants impeachment and re-
moval. The standard for the "best" model of investigation is, there-
fore, the one that most ably promotes this public consideration.
Looking at investigation from the perspective of the formation of
a national consensus about removal differs considerably from the
tone of most discussions of the Independent Counsel Act when it
was allowed to lapse in 1999.8 At that time, discussion centered
around partisan abuses that many felt had taken place under the
Act, balanced against the need for real independence in determin-
ing the facts of potential presidential wrongdoing.9 The abuses led
most observers to favor nonrenewal.10 Nevertheless, it was taken
for granted that facts could be fairly and accurately determined,
and that, if they were, Congress and the people would accept the
facts and act on them.
11
That assumption may not have been warranted even in 1999. To-
day, however, in an era of alternative facts and the death of truth,
actual public acceptance of facts found becomes the most important
consideration. There is a tension in this highly partisan age be-
tween determining the relevant facts, on the one hand, and doing
so in a way that can lead to formation of a national consensus about
presidential removal, on the other. Simply put, today, an investi-
gation that is viewed as controlled by a President's political ene-
mies, however competently executed, will not enable the people to
make the necessary judgment about whether a President should be
removed from office. No national consensus would be possible out
of such a process. To be acceptable, a model of investigation must
be one that could potentially convince many of a President's own
supporters that the President has engaged in serious wrongdoing.
With these considerations in mind, Part III proceeds to judge
which of the six models is best and concludes that none of the mod-
els is actually the best choice-the one that best balances the need
for accurate fact-finding with the need for political acceptance of the
8. See, e.g., Stephan 0. Kline, Heal It, Don't Bury It! Testimony on Reauthorization of
the Independent Counsel Act, 1999 L. REV. MICH. ST. U. DET. C. L. 51, 52 (1999).
9. See, e.g., id. at 64-68.
10. See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Lessons from a Debacle: From Impeachment to Reform, 51
FLA. L. REV. 599, 600 (1999).
11. Thus, ABA President Philip S. Anderson testified before the House Judiciary Com-
mittee that the defects of the Act "include[d] its failure to assure accountability of the inde-
pendent counsel; the possibility that an independent prosecutor may investigate and some-
times prosecute matters that are trivial or innocuous; the danger that open-ended investiga-
tions will waste taxpayer money; and the creation of conflicting responsibilities for independ-
ent counsels." Rhonda McMillion, Good Idea Gone Bad, A.B.A. J., May 1999, at 81. These
concerns are with a kind of partisan harassment, not a concern that facts accurately found
would not be accepted.
228 Vol. 57
Presidential Wrongdoing
facts found. Therefore, in Part IV, I set forth a hybrid model that I
hope combines the needed political acceptance with some assurance
of accuracy and independence.
In a highly toxic political environment, one in which politics no
longer seems to work because Americans find it difficult to trust
each other, it may be fanciful to imagine that any mechanism of
investigating a President can transcend America's political divi-
sions. Nevertheless, those of us who are committed to constitu-
tional democracy cannot afford to give in to despair. We must con-
tinue to work to make constitutional democracy possible again.
Finding a workable model for investigation of presidential wrong-
doing is one necessary aspect of any potential democratic renais-
sance.
I. THE MODELS OF INVESTIGATING PRESIDENTIAL
WRONGDOING
In considering these models, I will paint with a broad brush.
There are important potential differences in the details of each
model that the reader can easily imagine, but which are beyond my
purposes here. My goal is to broadly consider the following basic,
differing approaches.
A. The Independent Counsel Model
This model is the most familiar and the easiest to describe. Its
well-known exemplar is the Independent Counsel Act 12 that was
enacted in 1978, was amended at various points, and was allowed
to lapse in 1999.13 This model potentially offers a high level of in-
dependence from Executive Branch oversight, combined with effec-
tive criminal investigative expertise. The Act was limited to inves-
tigation of serious federal crimes by a certain class of high govern-
ment officials.14 It aimed at criminal prosecution, with a final re-
port submitted to the judicial panel of appointment "setting forth
fully and completely a description of the work of the independent
counsel, including the disposition of all cases brought."15 Con-
versely, the annual report to Congress was concerned only with
oversight of the progress of any investigations and prosecutions
that an Independent Counsel was engaged in, to ensure that the
12. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-99 (1994).
13. See Fran Quigley, Torture, Impunity, and the Need for Independent Prosecutorial
Oversight of the Executive Branch, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLY 271, 299-302 (2010).
14. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a)-(c).
15. Id. § 594(h)(1)(B).
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expenditures for the Independent Counsel were justified.16 Clearly,
despite this language, the Independent Counsel did evolve into an
aid to Congress' impeachment and removal deliberations.
17
The amendments to the Act over the years reflected differing con-
cerns with wrongdoing in the Executive Branch. The Act was
amended to prevent the investigation of relatively minor crimes,
but to include the investigation of wrongdoing arising out of the in-
vestigation itself, such as perjury and obstruction of justice, and to
permit requests that the original subject of investigation be
changed or enlarged.
18
These changes were certainly important in historical context, but
they did not alter the fundamental nature of the office. The Inde-
pendent Counsel remained a temporary, inferior officer, appointed
by a panel of federal judges at the request of the Attorney General,
and was removable only for good cause.19 These attributes meant
that the President would usually have a role in the decision whether
to seek the appointment of an Independent Counsel, but would have
no role at all in naming the person and only a restricted role in re-
moval. This ensured a genuinely independent investigation.
The constitutional permissibility of such independent criminal
investigation was upheld by the Supreme Court in Morrison v. 01-
son,20 against a powerful dissent by Justice Antonin Scalia.21 In
Scalia's view, a purely executive function, such as criminal investi-
gation, had to be "fully within the supervision and control of the
President."22 While the Morrison case did not involve allegations of
wrongdoing by a President, Justice Scalia was plainly assuming the
same conclusion would apply to an investigation of the President.
23
Notwithstanding Justice Scalia's dissent, however, Morrison spe-
cifically upheld the Act's limits on presidential control.24 Therefore,
the Independent Counsel Model constitutes the furthest reach of
16. Id. § 595(a)(2).
17. For a discussion of the Starr Report and the relationship between the Independent
Counsel statute and impeachment proceedings, see Ken Gormley, Impeachment and the In-
dependent Counsel: A Dysfunctional Union, 51 STAN. L. REV. 309, 312-13 (1999).
18. For a history of changes in the Act, see Katy J. Harriger, The History of the Independ-
ent Counsel Provisions: How the Past Informs the Current Debate, 49 MERCER L. REV. 489,
506-514 (1998).
19. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1).
20. 487 U.S. 654, 660-61 (1988).
21. Id. at 697 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 708.
23. See id. at 713. He referred not only to the President's ability to protect "his staff' but
also "to protect himself." Id.
24. Id. at 685-94.
230 Vol. 57
Presidential Wrongdoing
constitutionally acceptable independent investigation within the
Executive Branch.
25
B. The Special Counsel Model
26
Robert Mueller was appointed Special Counsel for the United
States Department of Justice by Acting Attorney General Rod
Rosenstein pursuant to statutory and regulatory authorization that
describes the authority of the Special Counsel as that of existing
U.S. Attorneys.27 Department regulations specify that "[t]he Attor-
ney General, or... the Acting Attorney General, will appoint a Spe-
cial Counsel" when the Attorney General, or Acting Attorney Gen-
eral, determines that:
(a) That investigation or prosecution of that person or matter
by a United States Attorney's Office or litigating Division of the
Department of Justice would present a conflict of interest for
the Department or other extraordinary circumstances; and
(b) That under the circumstances, it would be in the public in-
terest to appoint an outside Special Counsel to assume respon-
sibility for the matter.
28
Although the regulations governing appointment of a Special
Counsel are in some ways parallel to those of the Independent
Counsel Act, there are notable differences that render the Special
Counsel much less independent. In both, the decision of the Attor-
ney General to begin the process of appointment of outside counsel,
or not, is essentially unreviewable, but the standard under which
one is called for was much more specific under the Act than it is
25. The decision to permit the Independent Counsel Act to expire may be thought to be
after-the-fact affirmation of Justice Scalia's constitutional concerns. See L. Darnell Weeden,
A Post-Impeachment Indictment of the Independent Counsel Statute, 28 N. KY. L. REV. 536,
552 (2001).
26. The appointment of a Special Counsel is to be distinguished from the staff of the
United States Office of Special Counsel, which safeguards the civil service system from
abuse. See Rebecca L. Dobias, Amending the Whistleblower Protection Act: Will Federal Em-
ployees Finally Speak Without Fear, 13 FED. CIR. B. J. 117, 119 (2003).
27. 28 U.S.C. § 515 (2019); 28 C.F.R. § 600.6 (2019). Attorney General Jeff Sessions had
recused himself. See Margaret Hartmann, The Complete History of President Trump's Feud
with Jeff Sessions, INTELLIGENCER (Nov. 7, 2018), http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2018/11/
history-trump-jeff-sessions-feud.html. Prior to this instance, Attorney General Janet Reno
had appointed Robert Fiske a Special Counsel to investigate the Whitewater matter prior to
the reauthorization of the Independent Counsel Act. Fiske Named Special Counsel in Clinton
Probe, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 20, 1994), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1994-01-20-
9401210130-story.html.
28. 28 C.F.R. § 600.1 (2019).
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under the current regulations.29 Also, once the process of appoint-
ment is initiated, the President, through the Attorney General, pre-
sumably will have some influence in the choice of the Special Coun-
sel. The President could at least expect that a political enemy
would not be named. Conversely, the Executive Branch had no role
in the selection of the individual who would serve as Independent
Counsel under the Act.3
°
Importantly, once appointed, the Independent Counsel had com-
plete discretion to conduct the investigation.3 1 But the discretion of
a Special Counsel, although hedged by safeguards, is subject to the
oversight of the Attorney General.
3 2
Both the Independent Counsel and a Special Counsel may only
be removed for good cause,33 but since the Attorney General may,
in an extreme instance, direct that a particular prosecutorial step
not be taken,3 4 failure of the Special Counsel to obey such a lawful
order would presumably constitute good cause for removal. There-
fore, a Special Counsel can theoretically be removed for a decision
concerning the manner in which an investigation proceeds. Plus,
the Independent Counsel could obtain judicial review of any for-
cause removal,3 5 whereas, without such a specification, there is rea-
son to doubt that any judicial review would occur in the instance of
29. 28 U.S.C. § 591(a) (1994) provides as follows: "The Attorney General shall conduct a
preliminary investigation in accordance with section 592 whenever the Attorney General re-
ceives information sufficient to constitute grounds to investigate whether any person de-
scribed in subsection (b) may have violated any Federal criminal law other than a violation
classified as a Class B or C misdemeanor or an infraction." Section 592(c) provides that the
Attorney General "shall apply" for the appointment of an independent counsel if "there are
reasonable grounds to believe that further investigation is warranted." Id. § 592(c)(1)(A)
(1994). In contrast, 28 C.F.R. § 600.1(b) provides: "That under the circumstances, it would
be in the public interest to appoint an outside Special Counsel to assume responsibility for
the matter."
30. The judicial panel named the Independent Counsel. 28 U.S.C. § 593(b) (1994).
31. See id. at § 594(a) (1994) (listing oversight responsibilities of the Attorney General).
32. 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(b) (2019) provides: "The Special Counsel shall not be subject to the
day-to-day supervision of any official of the Department. However, the Attorney General
may request that the Special Counsel provide an explanation for any investigative or prose-
cutorial step, and may after review conclude that the action is so inappropriate or unwar-
ranted under established Departmental practices that it should not be pursued. In conduct-
ing that review, the Attorney General will give great weight to the views of the Special Coun-
sel. If the Attorney General concludes that a proposed action by a Special Counsel should
not be pursued, the Attorney General shall notify Congress as specified in § 600.9(a)(3)."
33. For the Special Counsel, see id. § 600.7(d): "The Attorney General may remove a Spe-
cial Counsel for misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict of interest, or for other
good cause, including violation of Departmental policies." For the Independent Counsel, see
28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(1) (1994).
34. 28 C.F.R. § 600.7(b).
35. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a)(3).
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removal of a Special Counsel. Without congressional direction, good
cause removal might well be considered a political question.
36
In terms of subject matter, the advantage of the flexibility of the
standard of appointment of a Special Counsel is that the matter to
be investigated need not even name the crimes alleged to be com-
mitted or the persons to be investigated. Thus, the letter appoint-
ing Robert Mueller gave as justification for the appointment, the
need for a full and thorough investigation of the "Russian govern-
ment's efforts to interfere in the 2016 presidential election," and
specified the subjects to be investigated as "any links and/or coordi-
nation between the Russian government and individuals associated
with the campaign of President Donald Trump."
37
Like the Independent Counsel Model, the Special Counsel Model
concerns itself primarily with criminal prosecution. The current
regulations do not even refer to reports to Congress at the conclu-
sion of the work of the Special Counsel.38 Thus, the letter appoint-
ing Robert Mueller authorized prosecution, but not a final report to
Congress and the public.
39
C. The Ad Hoc Special Prosecutor Model
In the Watergate scandal, public pressure "forced the Attorney
General to appoint two independent prosecutors ([Archibald] Cox
and [Ron] Jaworski) without a statutory mandate.'40 While techni-
cally accurate, this formulation by Professor Merrill might suggest
that the ad hoc Special Prosecutor served at the will of the Attorney
General to conduct the investigation as the Attorney General di-
rected. However, it was later held that the regulation that Attorney
General Elliot Richardson adopted appointing the Special Prosecu-
tor 41 had the full force and effect of law until lawfully revoked.42 For
this reason, the firing of Archibald Cox in the famous Saturday
36. See Richard Rothman & Katelin Shugart-Schmidt, Lying in Wait: How a Court
Should Handle the First Pretextual For-Cause Removal, 86 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1348, 1369
(2018).
37. The text of the letter, Order No. 3915-2017, is set forth at Rod Rosenstein's Letter
Appointing Mueller Special Counsel, N.Y. TIMES (May 17, 2017), https://www.ny-
times.com/interactive/2017/05/17/us/politics/document-Robert-Mueller-Special-Counsel-Rus
sia.html.
38. 28 C.F.R. § 600.8(c) (2019) provides that the Special Counsel "shall provide the At-
torney General with a confidential report," and § 600.9(c) allows, but does not require, "public
release" of reports by the Attorney General.
39. See Rod Rosenstein's Letter, supra note 37.
40. Merrill, supra note 4, at 1078.
41. Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 38 Fed. Reg. 14688 (May 25, 1973).
For the history of the appointment, see Frank Tuerkheimer, Watergate as History, 1990 WIS.
L. REV. 1323, 1325-26 (1990).
42. Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104, 108 (D.D.C. 1973).
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Night Massacre by Acting Attorney General Robert Bork was held
to have been unlawful.43 Therefore, the historical instance of the
Watergate Special Prosecutor does not turn out to differ im-
portantly from the Special Counsel Model above. In both instances,
the outside counsel was a creature of administrative regulations
once those regulations were formally adopted.
In contrast to that historical instance, the Ad Hoc Special Prose-
cutor Model I am imagining is closer to the one that Judge Gesell
suggested would have been the case had no regulations been
adopted and the Special Prosecutor had just been appointed: "Had
no such limitations been issued, the Attorney General would have
had the authority to fire Mr. Cox at any time and for any reason."44
In other words, without any formal regulations, the firing of Cox
would have been lawful. This context would render the Ad Hoc Spe-
cial Prosecutor Model much less independent of presidential control
than the previous two models.
In terms of the formalities of removal, the actual power was
lodged in the Attorney General or Acting Attorney General,45 rather
than in the President. That is why President Nixon had to dismiss
officials in the Justice Department in order to effect Cox's removal
in the Saturday Night Massacre,46 which gave the public the chance
to react to the firing. That gap between the President and removal
of the special prosecutor, which is also the case in the prior two
models, allows President Trump to delegitimate the Mueller inves-
tigation without having to take the political responsibility of actu-
ally acting. I will come back to this issue below.
As for subject matter and jurisdiction, these are left flexible in
the Special Prosecutor Model. The appointment regulation for
Archibald Cox gave authority to the Special Prosecutor to investi-
gate and prosecute crimes arising out of the Watergate burglary
and the 1972 presidential election and "allegations involving the
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 38 Fed. Reg. 14688, providing that
the special prosecutor does not name the Attorney General as the authority for removal, but
since the Attorney General was the appointing authority, the authority was treated as lodged
in the Attorney General.
46. President Nixon ordered Attorney General Elliot Richardson to fire Cox. Richardson
refused and resigned effective immediately. Nixon then ordered Deputy Attorney General
William Ruckelshaus to fire Cox; Ruckelshaus refused, and also resigned. Nixon then or-
dered the third-most-senior official at the Justice Department, Solicitor General Robert Bork,
to fire Cox, who complied. See Orrin G. Hatch, The Independent Counsel Statute and Ques-
tions About Its Future, 62 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 145, 145-46 (1999).
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President, members of the White House staff, or Presidential ap-
pointees."
47
D. The Permanent Executive Branch Office Model
One model of Executive Branch investigation of presidential
wrongdoing that has been suggested, but not tried, is the creation
of permanent bodies with this responsibility within the Executive
Branch. Professor Merrill calls this the "Civil Service Option" to
emphasize the protections from removal that employees of such an
office could enjoy.48 A permanent office dedicated to investigating
wrongdoing by high government officials would presumably develop
enormous expertise and independence in such proceedings. Of
course, as will be discussed below, this model strains even the flex-
ible separation-of- powers analysis in Morrison, because it thor-
oughly and intentionally insulates the office from presidential over-
sight and would likely be found unconstitutional.
A related suggestion that does not raise that kind of constitu-
tional objection is one that Professor Merrill refers to as the "In-
spector General Option."49 This approach would utilize the Inspec-
tors General in the Executive Branch, who already conduct investi-
gations of inefficiency or illegality in government agencies, and who
already have a kind of built-in tenure, such that they are not always
removed with changes in the party that controls the government.
Both of these suggestions have the advantage of creating perma-
nent institutions and thus possibly minimizing the political nature
of investigations of presidential wrongdoing. These kinds of offices,
however they might be structured, do not instantly bring the kind
of counter-productive political pressure that any talk of creating a
new body, or newly appointing an individual, inevitably sparks
when presidential wrongdoing is being discussed as a potential
matter for investigation.
E. The U.S. Attorney Model
Another permanent entity that could operate in the context of in-
vestigation of presidential wrongdoing, but one outside the Wash-
ington locus of the above models, is the Office of the U.S. Attorney.
The current Special Counsel regulations provide alternatives
should the Attorney General determine that a Special Counsel
47. Office of Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 38 Fed. Reg. 14688.
48. Merrill, supra note 4, at 1063.
49. Id. at 1064-65.
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should not be appointed.50 One of these alternatives is that the
matter should be handled by "the appropriate component" of the
Justice Department.51 I assume that the appropriate component
would often be the local U.S. Attorney.
Essentially, this model of regular law enforcement within a gen-
eral investigation of a President is currently being utilized by Mr.
Mueller, who has referred numerous matters to the U.S. Attorney
for the Southern District of New York for possible prosecution.
52
Some of those matters seem to relate to Mueller's investigation of
Russia collusion, while others do not.
53
But the model would normally unfold somewhat differently. A
matter implicating a President need not emerge from a context in-
volving national security, defense, or any other obvious high gov-
ernment matter. For example, after the New York Times published
a lengthy account of past tax and accounting practices of the Trump
family, the New York State Department of Taxation and Finance
announced that it would open what amounts to an ordinary tax
fraud investigation.54
For that matter, just as the Watergate scandal originally began
as an investigation into a minor crime unrelated to the President-
"a bungled burglary"55-a U.S. Attorney's Office might stumble
onto presidential wrongdoing through an investigation that did not
appear, at the outset, to involve high government officials at all. In
such an instance, a U.S. Attorney might pursue such an investiga-
tion against progressively more highly placed government officials
until discovering evidence that implicated a President in wrongdo-
ing. At that point, presumably the matter would be brought to the
attention of Justice Department officials in Washington for further
action.
Proceedings of this nature, unlike the previous three models,
would not necessarily attract much public attention, especially in
50. 28 C.F.R. § 600.2 (2019) (Alternatives available to the Attorney General).
51. Id.
52. See Erica Orden, Exclusive: Mueller Refers Foreign Agent Inquiries to New York Pros-
ecutors, CNN POL. (Aug. 1, 2018, 6:01 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2018/07/31/politics/mueller-
investigation-foreign-agent-referrals-new-york/index.html.
53. See id.
54. Bob Bryan, The New York Times Investigation into Trump's Business Empire Could
Land the President in Hot Water, Legal Experts Say, BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 4, 2018, 2:22 PM),
https://www.businessinsider.com/new-york-times-trump-wealth-story-can-trump-face-in-
vestigation-charges-2018-10.
55. Watergate and the White House: The 'Third-Rate Burglary' That Toppled a President,




the beginning. That might render such an investigation highly ef-
fective. On the other hand, resources at such a local level would be
limited, and the investigation itself would not be organized to max-
imize the chances of implicating the President. That outcome would
probably be the last thing any U.S. Attorney would welcome.
F. The Legislative Branch Model
This final model is one that will inevitably function should seri-
ous presidential wrongdoing be uncovered. Obviously, there would
be Legislative Branch investigation if the House of Representatives
pursued impeachment of a President.56 But, even short of that, any
serious allegations of wrongdoing in the government would inevita-
bly bring some form of congressional investigation. In fact, it might
be that a preliminary congressional investigation of more or less
ordinary government malfeasance sets in motion further investiga-
tion that uncovers presidential wrongdoing.
There are too many possible forms of this model to do much more
than just list this option. Presumably, the major part of an investi-
gation of presidential wrongdoing would have already been finished
by some body before impeachment would be considered. Once facts
were found that might warrant impeachment of a President, fur-
ther investigation would be expected to be conducted through a Spe-
cial Congressional Committee, or Joint Committee.
But there is another, more exotic, possibility. Congress does have
the option of creating and funding an investigatory office within the
Legislative Branch for allegations of serious government wrongdo-
ing.57 That approach would be capable of yielding both an inde-
pendent, and presumably highly professional, investigation. Such
an office would function similarly to the Permanent Executive
Branch Office Model above, but, since the investigators would be
located within the Legislative Branch, there would be no constitu-
tional issues involving necessary presidential oversight.
56. The House Judiciary Committee would play the primary role in the initiation of im-
peachment proceedings, see Jonathan K. Geldert, Presidential Advisors and Their Most Un-
presidential Activities: Why Executive Privilege Cannot Shield White House Information in
the U.S. Attorney Firings Controversy, 49 B.C. L. REV. 823, 855 n.265 (2008), but there are no
specific requirements as to how the Committee must perform its investigation.
57. While Bowsher u. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 723 (1986), held that executive functions could
not be conferred upon a legislative branch officer, investigation on behalf of Congress would
fall within legislative branch responsibilities. See generally Steven R. Ross et al., The Rise
and Permanence of Quasi-Legislative Independent Commissions, 27 J.L. & POL. 415 (2012).
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II. WHAT DOES "BEST" MEAN IN THE CONTEXT OF
INVESTIGATING PRESIDENTIAL WRONGDOING?
First, any investigatory model must be constitutional. At the mo-
ment, Morrison's highly flexible approach-referred to in the Con-
stitutional Law textbook I use as "functionalism" as opposed to the
dissent's "formalism"58-provides the relevant constitutional stand-
ard. According to Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, a
President must have sufficient oversight of any investigation and
prosecution of government officials-a process that everyone agrees
must, at least in terms of prosecution, be considered execution of
the laws-that the President may be said to be able take care that
the laws are being faithfully executed.
59
In the context of the Independent Counsel Act at issue in Morri-
son, the Court held that this broad standard was satisfied because
the initiation of the process was held firmly by an official over whom
the President exercised complete policy control. An Attorney Gen-
eral who sought the appointment of an Independent Counsel over
the President's objection could lawfully be fired for doing so.60 In
addition, the standard of removal of the Independent Counsel only
for good cause was a standard that had previously been held to sat-
isfy the necessary level of presidential oversight in a variety of
quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative contexts.6 1 This is the standard
under which independent agencies routinely function.6 2 It is true
that a President had no say in the actual selection of the Independ-
ent Counsel, but that was a function of the Appointments Clause
itself, which specifically permits inferior officers to be appointed by
Article III Judges.63
The conclusion that an Independent Counsel is an inferior officer,
as opposed to an officer who must be nominated by the President
58. JESSE H. CHOPER ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES, COMMENTS, AND QUESTIONS
258 (12th ed. 2015).
59. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 696 (1988) ("Notwithstanding the fact that the coun-
sel is to some degree 'independent' and free from executive supervision to a greater extent
than other federal prosecutors, in our view these features of the Act give the Executive
Branch sufficient control over the independent counsel to ensure that the President is able
to perform his constitutionally assigned duties.").
60. Not everyone would agree with that assertion, but it is at least one major approach
to what it means for the Attorney General to serve at the will of the President. See Bruce A.
Green & Rebecca Roiphe, Can the President Control the Department of Justice?, 70 ALA. L.
REV. 1, 33-34 (2018).
61. See, e.g., Humphrey's Ex'r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 626 (1935) (upholding lim-
its on removal of a Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission).
62. See generally id. (upholding congressional authority to limit the grounds for removal
of a Commissioner of the Federal Trade Commission).
63. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
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and confirmed by the Senate, might be considered debatable. This
holding was contested in Justice Scalia's dissent,6 4 but, despite crit-
icism,6 5 has not been overturned.66
Under the Morrison standard, most of the models discussed
above are plainly constitutional. The one exception might be the
Permanent Executive Branch Office Model, because, at least in its
civil service manifestation, appointment and removal would be
strongly protected from presidential influence, probably beyond
even the constitutional permissiveness of Morrison.
There is a real possibility that the flexible Morrison standard will
be abandoned by the new, more conservative majority currently
constituted on the Supreme Court.6 7 In such an eventuality, which
cannot be reliably predicted one way or the other, the major changes
would be that the removal of any investigator within the Executive
Branch would have to be at the will of the officer who appointed her
and, if that officer were not the President, that officer would in turn
have to be removable at will by the President.6 8 I will not set this
kind of change as a limiting factor in this essay, but the reader
should keep in mind that an investigation genuinely independent
of the President would be impossible under such a new standard,
as indeed Justice Scalia argued it should be in his Morrison dis-
sent.6
9
The requirement of constitutionality also means that certain
quite serviceable models of investigating presidential wrongdoing
are simply not available within the American constitutional sys-
tem. For example, in Columbia, the Supreme Court has authority
to act if alleged presidential wrongdoing is criminal.7 0 That model
64. Though Justice Scalia did dispute the conclusion that the independent counsel was
an inferior officer. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 715-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
65. See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, The Independent Counsel Mess, 102 HARV. L. REV. 105,
106, 110 (1988).
66. But see Jackson C. Blais, Note, Mischief Managed? The Unconstitutionality of SEC
ALJS Under the Appointments Clause, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2115, 2127-28 (2018) (argu-
ing that Morrison no longer sets the constitutional standard of finding an officer to be infe-
rior).
67. Justice Scalia's opinion for the Court in Edmond v. United States, holding that civil-
ian Judges of the Coast Guard Court of Criminal Appeals are inferior officers, surely presages
a more formal approach to oversight issues, but expressly distinguished, rather than over-
ruling or even criticizing, Morrison's holding that the Independent Counsel was an inferior
officer. Edmond v. United States, 520 U.S. 651, 661 (1997).
68. Cf. Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
69. See 487 U.S. at 708 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
70. See Pablo Echeverri, Accountability of Public Officials and Separation of Powers in
the United States, France, and Colombia (manuscript on file with the author); CONSTITUCION
POLITICA DE COLOMBIA, art. 174, 175.
Summer 2019
Duquesne Law Review
would satisfy much of the concerns expressed below about the nec-
essary nonpartisan nature of any presidential investigation in the
American context, but this approach is simply not possible here.
Similarly, in terms of removal, a two-thirds vote in the Senate is,
of course, an absolute requirement.71 No other body can perform a
presidential removal and no other body can review either such a
removal or the refusal by the Senate to remove the President.
72
Again, we can think of other possibilities that might work very well,
but this institutional arrangement sets the basic limits under which
the topic of American presidential wrongdoing must be addressed.
It may seem counter-intuitive to the reader, but in my view the
requirement of a Senate two-thirds vote is actually healthy in our
rent, partisan democracy today. Without it, one political party
would be tempted to remove a President without a national consen-
sus. Because of the two-thirds requirement, that undemocratic pos-
sibility is not an option.
This reality of a required super-majority in the Senate sets in re-
lief the other, and more important, requirement of what makes a
model of presidential investigation "best." Not only must it be con-
stitutional, it must be one that will permit the formation of a na-
tional consensus that a President who has been found to have en-
gaged in wrongdoing must be removed from office. The model must
be one that even the President's supporters, or at least many of
them, can come to accept as rendering a fair judgment on the matter
of presidential wrongdoing.
No one has ever denied that the most important goal of any in-
vestigation of presidential wrongdoing is that it allows impeach-
ment and removal of a dangerous and/or criminal leader. Whether
a President can be criminally prosecuted has been debated73 but, in
practice, the American experience shows that criminal prosecution
of a sitting President is not a real option. Thus, President Nixon
was named only an unindicted co-conspirator and President Clinton
was never charged with perjury.74 In these two most recent in-
stances of alleged presidential wrongdoing brought to light, it was
simply understood and accepted that impeachment and removal
were the only possible remedies for the actions of the President.
71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6.
72. See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 240 (1993) (Senate removal presents a po-
litical question).
73. For perspectives, see Susan Low Bloch, Can We Indict a Sitting President?, 2 NEXUS
7 (1997).
74. For consideration of the difficulty of prosecuting a sitting President that these two
instances demonstrate, see John Gilbeaut, Why Bill Clinton Won't Face a Criminal Trial,
A.B.A. J., April 1999, at 52.
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Therefore, removal of a President by the Senate remains the last
line of defense that our democracy has against potential tyranny.
The crucial role of the Senate in this regard was confirmed by the
Supreme Court in the Judge Walter Nixon removal case.7 5 There,
the Court confirmed the potential for "chaos" if a Senate removal of
a President could be challenged in court.76 There must be finality
in any judgment that the Senate makes.
The difficulty of obtaining a two-thirds vote for removal of a Pres-
ident, because of today's hyper-partisanship, shifts the balance in
evaluating models of investigation of presidential wrongdoing
against the importance of exoneration of a President falsely ac-
cused. Creating the conditions under which removal is a real pos-
sibility becomes the overwhelming goal. One would therefore
choose a model that would ensure that supporters of a President
could accept its verdict against a President, even though the model
would fail to convince opponents of a President that the President
was innocent of charges that had been found unsubstantiated.
Almost twenty years ago, Professor Merrill agreed implicitly that
any system of investigating a President must be one that permits
the House and the Senate to act.7 7 However, at that earlier time,
Professor Merrill emphasized accurate fact-finding as the most im-
portant attribute of any investigatory system.78 His evident as-
sumption was that if only the facts could be ferreted out, Congress
would act appropriately. That assumption inevitably places a high
value on preventing presidential interference with any investiga-
tion.
This assumption proved warranted during the Watergate inves-
tigation. It became clear to President Nixon that if wrongdoing on
his part were shown, enough Republicans in the Senate would vote
75. Nixon, 506 U.S. at 238.
76. Id. at 236 (quoting Nixon v. United States, 938 F.2d 239, 246 (D.C. Cir. 1991)).
77. See Merrill, supra note 4, at 1050 ("The first reason for having an independent inves-
tigator is to lay the groundwork for possible impeachment of the President.").
78. Professor Merrill was quite explicit about this: "The ultimate standard or criterion
should be how well each option would perform in practice. This in turn is largely a function
of how often each option would 'get it right,' meaning how often it would avoid both false
negatives-failing to detect and prosecute serious executive branch misconduct-and false
positives-investigating or prosecuting officials who are innocent or whose conduct does not
warrant criminal investigation or prosecution." Id. at 1065-66.
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against him to ensure his removal from office. 79 Perhaps that as-
sumption was even warranted in 1999, when Professor Merrill
wrote his article.
80
But, such an assumption is plainly not warranted today. Presi-
dent Trump was exaggerating when he claimed during the presi-
dential campaign that "I could stand in the middle of Fifth Avenue
and shoot somebody and I wouldn't lose any voters,"81 but only
mildly so. We live in an era in which there is such skepticism about
truth and truthfulness8 2 that it will be difficult to convince support-
ers of a President that any finding of wrongdoing is accurate and is
not the product of a political vendetta.
My judgment about this problem of reaching a national consen-
sus about presidential wrongdoing is not aimed particularly at sup-
porters of President Trump. I expect the same level of partisan sup-
port for any democratic President elected in the foreseeable future.
Indeed, even in the 1990s, President Clinton received a high level
of support in facing a charge that some of his supporters now admit
was more serious than they were willing to acknowledge at the
time.83
The foregoing considerations suggest to me that the best model
of investigation of presidential wrongdoing will combine some as-
pects of the following five features. First, the standards calling for
the initiation of an investigation should be as specific and manda-
tory as possible. Otherwise, it would be too easy for a President, or
the President's allies, to block the initiation of an investigation be-
fore the public realizes that there are serious potential issues of
presidential wrongdoing. Unfortunately, the need for specificity
79. See Dan Nowicki, In 1974, Goldwater and Rhodes Told Nixon He Was Doomed, AZ
CENT. (Aug. 2, 2014, 9:27 PM), https://www.azcentral.com/story/azdc/2014/08/03/goldwater-
rhodes-nixon-resignation/13497493/.
80. By the 1990's, partisanship was increasing. President Bill Clinton's first budget in
1993 received not a single Republican vote. See Bruce Ledewitz, What Has Gone Wrong and
What Can We Do About It?, 54 TULSA L. REV. 247, 248 (2019) (book review). Nevertheless,
Presidential wrongdoing might still have elicited a bipartisan response in 1999.
81. Trump: "I Could Stand in the Middle of Fifth Avenue and Shoot Somebody and I
Wouldn't Lose Any Voters", REAL CLEAR POL. (Jan. 23, 2016), https://www.realclearpoli-
tics.com/video/2016/01/23/trump-i-could-stand in the middle of fifth-avenue and shoot_
somebody-and i wouldntloseanyvoters.html.
82. See President Trump's comment on 60 Minutes that scientists reporting on climate
change have a big political agenda. Lesley Stahl, President Trump on Christine Blasey Ford,
His Relationships With Vladimir Putin and Kim Jong Un and More, CBS NEWS (Oct. 15,
2018), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/donald-trump-interview-60-minutes-full-transcript-
lesley-stahl-jamal-khashoggi-james-mattis-brett-kavanaugh-vladimir-putin-2018-10-14/.
83. See Tara Isabella Burton, One Reason Liberals Let Bill Clinton Off the Hook in the





will limit the flexibility referred to above in the naming of Robert
Mueller.8 4 There must be a balance.
Second, the appointing authority should be aligned politically
with the President. Any investigation of a President by a presumed
political enemy would be a non-starter among the President's sup-
porters in the current partisan environment.
Third, once initiated, the investigation should be totally free of
supervision by any official in the Executive Branch. Presidential
wrongdoing cannot be detected and proved unless the investigation
is completely unfettered.
But, fourth, in part because the investigation will have no effec-
tive oversight, the removal power should belong to the President
alone and must be completely discretionary. This will not only sat-
isfy any future constitutional standard of necessary presidential
oversight, it will also preclude the bizarre situation in which a Pres-
ident criticizes an investigation as unfair, thus undermining the ul-
timate acceptance of its findings, but refuses to take effective steps
to halt it.85
Finally, the goal of any investigation should be a report to Con-
gress and the people of the United States concerning the criminal
liability, or other wrongdoing, of the President. Any criminal pros-
ecution of others should be authorized, but only as a means to that
end. Because no major criminal prosecution needs to be prepared,
a reasonable time limit for the investigation can be set. The longer
the investigation goes on, the more it will seem to supporters of the
President that there is no serious wrongdoing, but that minor mat-
ters are being blown out of proportion.
Having set forth these five considerations, let me now apply them
to the previously noted models. Given these considerations, no
model works perfectly.
84. See supra notes 27-30 and accompanying text.
85. This was occurring before the removal of Jeff Sessions as Attorney General. Tell-
ingly, President Trump has cut back his criticisms of the Mueller investigation since then.
On Tuesday, February 19, 2019, a Justice Department spokesperson reiterated that Presi-
dent Trump has not asked Acting Attorney General Matthew Whitaker to interfere with the
Mueller investigation. Mark Mazzetti et al., Intimidation, Pressure and Humiliation: Inside
Trump's Two-Year War on the Investigations Encircling Him, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 19, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/19/us/politics/trump-investigations.html. Now that his al-




III. EVALUATING THE MODELS OF INVESTIGATING PRESIDENTIAL
WRONGDOING
A. The Independent Counsel Model
The original Independent Counsel Act delineated both standards
and timing requirements for an Attorney General to decide whether
to seek appointment of an Independent Counsel and a reporting re-
quirement for whatever the Attorney General's decision may be.8
6
It is true that there was to be no judicial review of a decision not to
request the appointment, but the Act was as specific and as man-
datory as may be possible. In addition, the conduct of the investi-
gation, once the Independent Counsel was appointed, was to be car-
ried out without further oversight by the Attorney General, except,
as in the authorization of wiretaps, where such involvement was
legally necessary.8 7 Thus, the Independent Counsel Model satisfies
the first and third factors reasonably well.
However, this extreme specificity sacrificed flexibility. Thus, the
Independent Counsel Act was a model of investigating crimes by
certain Executive Branch officials. Something else is needed to in-
vestigate presidential wrongdoing that might lead to impeachment
and removal.
In addition, the Independent Counsel Model is not well suited to
today's needs in terms of the second and fourth factors. The Inde-
pendent Counsel was to be selected by a panel of federal judges.
This led to an intensely partisan battle by the panel over the ap-
pointment of Kenneth Starr, who was considered a highly partisan
figure, especially compared to Robert Fiske, a Republican previ-
ously named Special Counsel by Attorney General Reno.88 Today,
even the hint that an Independent Counsel was appointed by a
President's political enemies would be sufficient to undermine con-
fidence in any investigation that was conducted, whatever its re-
sults.
The preclusion of removal except for a determination of "good
cause" by the Attorney General,8 9 while ensuring that an investiga-
tion is independent of presidential interference, also means that a
President could, and likely would, complain publicly that an inves-
86. 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-92 (1994).
87. Id. § 594 (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2516 (2019).
88. David Johnston, Appointment in Whitewater Turns into a Partisan Battle, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 13, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/1994/08/13/us/appointment-in-whitewater-turns-
into-a-partisan-battle.html.
89. 28 U.S.C. § 596(a) (2019).
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tigation was being conducted unfairly or had simply reached inac-
curate conclusions. A President could plausibly claim that the law
did not permit him to remove the Independent Counsel. Such pres-
idential actions would probably convince many of the President's
supporters that the President should not be removed from office,
which would in turn easily prevent a two-thirds vote for removal in
the Senate. Although the Independent Counsel Act might have the
benefit of convincing many of the President's critics that a President
should not be removed, should the investigation prove negative as
to presidential wrongdoing, it would not achieve the most necessary
goal of investigating presidential misconduct. It would not lead to
removal where presidential wrongdoing was found.
B. The Special Counsel Model
Surprisingly, the Special Counsel Model turns out in some ways
to be the worst of all worlds. As currently set forth, the regulations
give the Attorney General entirely too much discretion in appoint-
ing, or not appointing, a Special Counsel. While the language of the
appointment is mandatory, the standards of conflict of interest or
extraordinary circumstances, combined with the public good, are
entirely arbitrary.90 Nor is any structured decision-making re-
quired.91
In addition, the existing regulations do not entirely foreclose At-
torney General interference with a Special Counsel's investigation.
In these ways, the Special Counsel Model as currently structured
both creates too little independence for the investigation and does
not ensure that any investigation will even commence.
Plus, the existing limit of removal to good cause found by the At-
torney General creates the same issues as it does for the Independ-
ent Counsel above. The President lacks full personal authority to
remove the Special Counsel.
The advantage of the Special Counsel Model is that the Attorney
General names the individual who conducts the investigation.
92
This would insulate, to some extent, any presidential complaint
that an investigation was being conducted unfairly in order to ben-
efit the President's enemies. Another advantage is that the model





allows a more expansive conception of what and whom is to be in-
vestigated, as the terms of appointment of Robert Mueller, dis-
cussed above,93 show.
C. The Ad Hoc Special Prosecutor Model
This model also has the advantage that the actual appointment
of the person who will conduct the investigation of the President
remains in the hands of the President's political allies. But it has
the disadvantage that the absence of preexisting regulations or
statutes means that the initiation of appointment is entirely at the
Attorney General's discretion. Also, there might be investigatory
oversight by the Attorney General, depending on the terms of the
appointment.94 In addition, as in the case of the appointment of
Archibald Cox, removal might be limited to good cause.95 Thus,
most of the factors set forth above are not satisfied in this model.
Basically, this model is by far the most flexible, and always re-
mains an option in any future crisis of alleged presidential wrong-
doing. This model could easily be used in order to aid Congress in
an impeachment investigation, for example. Because of its discre-
tionary elements, however, it should not be relied upon as the only
model for investigation of presidential wrongdoing.
D. The Permanent Executive Branch Office Model
The advantage of the Civil Service or Inspector General ap-
proaches is that an office of this type could be structured to investi-
gate all manner of wrongdoing anywhere in the government. It
would not necessarily be restricted to criminal wrongdoing and
need not be limited to investigating high government officials. If
such an office did not conduct the actual prosecution, the Morrison
standard would certainly permit removal only for good cause. Such
an office would be well-suited to report to Congress and the people.
On the other hand, as the Russia collusion investigation shows, the
allegations of presidential wrongdoing might not be limited to the
President's actual conduct of government.96
While this model could thus be structured to be both constitu-
tional and effective, it would clearly fail in a political sense. A per-
93. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
94. See supra notes 40-43 and accompanying text.
95. This was the effect of the ruling with regard to the firing. See id.
96. The initiation of that investigation, of course, concerned the election of 2016, rather
than the conduct of the government once President Trump was elected. See supra note 37.
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manent office of this kind is precisely the kind of "deep state" activ-
ity that is regularly denounced by supporters of President Trump.
97
Even aside from the current political rhetoric, it is hard to envision
the American people accepting that such an important role in re-
moving a President would be played by unknown and unseen fed-
eral bureaucrats.
In terms of the five features listed above, the standards of such
an office would presumably be specified, the investigation would be
free of Executive Branch supervision, and reports could be fur-
nished to Congress. However, the investigators would not be
named by allies of the President and there would be no real possi-
bility of removal by the President. Any conclusions by such an office
would never convince the President's upporters in the public or in
the Senate.
E. The U.S. Attorney Model
This model is actually the most intriguing possibility, but it is
hard to see how it could be institutionalized. A U.S. Attorney is
nominated by the President, confirmed by the Senate and remova-
ble at will by the President.98 Therefore, any investigation by a U.S.
Attorney of wrongdoing in the government has instant political
credibility. If such an officer stumbled upon serious wrongdoing by
a President through some ordinary criminal investigation, any re-
sulting report would be taken very seriously by the President's al-
lies in Congress and, presumably, by the President's supporters
among the public as well.
In addition, there would not be any likelihood of interference with
such an investigation, because in its early stages, no one, including
the U.S. Attorney, would know that the investigation might turn up
wrongdoing by the President. Of course, at some point, that possi-
bility would become obvious and it would require enormous political
courage by a U.S. Attorney to continue the investigation, notwith-
standing the possible political fallout. In my experience, however,
we do have U.S. Attorneys of high integrity.
But the model's advantages also demonstrate its impracticality
institutionally. Simply put, it would be a happenstance if presiden-
tial wrongdoing fell into the lap of a U.S. Attorney in this way. In
a sense, the model is always available as long as there are honest
97. See Jon D. Michaels, The American Deep State, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1653, 1653
(2018).
98. See Sara Sun Beale, Rethinking the Identity and Role of United States Attorneys, 6
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 369, 370 (2009).
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women and men in the Justice Department, but it cannot be re-
garded as a reliable answer to the issue of investigating presiden-
tial wrongdoing.
F. The Legislative Branch Model
If, as argued here, consideration of impeachment and removal,
and not criminal prosecution, is the goal of any investigation of
presidential wrongdoing, then the Legislative Branch Model is the
obvious choice for the investigation. This, after all, is where im-
peachment and removal happen.99
The problem is both institutional and political. Institutionally,
Congress is not particularly good at investigating wrongdoing. At
least preliminarily, professional investigators in the Executive
Branch are far superior. Congress can effectively present the re-
sults of such investigations to the public, but Congress is not a good
detective. Of course, this disadvantage could be mitigated by the
creation of a permanent investigatory office within the Legislative
Branch, as suggested above.100 America has never proceeded in this
formal way of inter-branch checking, but it could be done.
Politically, on the other hand, such an investigation could never
be effective. If the President's party controls Congress, the investi-
gation will not be allowed to begin, permanent investigatory office
or not. A high level of proof of presidential wrongdoing developed
through one of the other models would be necessary before the Pres-
ident's party would initiate impeachment proceedings, even prelim-
inarily.
And, of course, if the other party controls Congress, there is zero
possibility that the President's upporters in the public, or in Con-
gress, would ever support or vote to remove the President based on
the congressional investigation. Congressional involvement must
happen eventually, if impeachment and removal are to be possibil-
ities, but cannot be the major, and certainly not the only, focus.
IV. A HYBRID MODEL OF INVESTIGATING PRESIDENTIAL
WRONGDOING
In retrospect, the appointment of Robert Mueller and subsequent
developments in his investigation have gone fairly well in terms of
99. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 2 cl. 5 (impeachment power of the House); § 3, cl. 6 (power to try
impeachments in the Senate).
100. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
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the goals and structure of an investigation of presidential wrongdo-
ing. Mueller is a registered Republican, not conceivably considered
an enemy of President Trump when he was appointed.10 1 He was
given a broad subject to investigate and has been allowed broad dis-
cretion in conducting the investigation.
10 2
Nevertheless, the Mueller investigation has been undermined to
such an extent hat it seems unlikely that even a finding of obvious
presidential wrongdoing would lead to a vote of removal in the Sen-
ate. The Mueller investigation has been undermined by several fac-
tors-some simply bad luck, others structural, and others in the
way the investigation has gone forward.
The bad luck involved two matters. First, Mueller was not ap-
pointed by the Attorney General, a political ally of the President,
but by an Acting Attorney General who had no independent credi-
bility with the supporters of the President.10 3 Second, one of the
investigators on Mueller's staff, since removed, was exposed as a
political opponent of the President.10 4 In the current environment,
it does not take much to convincingly characterize an investigation
of a President as political, as far as the President's supporters are
concerned. 105
The structural issue is that, because President Trump does not
himself have removal authority over Mueller, he has been able to
"call" for Mueller's removal, without having to take the political
heat for actually acting.106 This relentless drumbeat of criticism
has already rendered the investigation incapable of performing its
101. For a flavor of reaction at the time of the appointment, see Joseph D. Lyons, Is Robert
Mueller a Democrat or Republican? His Appointment Was Lauded by Both Parties, BUSTLE
(May 18, 2017), https://www.bustle.com/p/is-robert-mueller-a-democrat-republican-his-ap-
pointment-was-lauded-by-both-p arties-58693.
102. Indeed, it was just this lack of interference that President Trump increasingly criti-
cized. See supra notes 1-3 and accompanying text.
103. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. Rod Rosenstein, who was appointed by
President George W. Bush, but served for all eight years under President Barack Obama,
reportedly thinks of himself as a career prosecutor, without a base in politics. See Darren
Samuelsohn, Rod Rosenstein, Deputy Attorney General, The Ever-Civil Servant, POLITICO,
https://www.politico.com/interactives/20 18/politico50/rod-rosenstein/ (last visited Apr. 3,
2019).
104. Kevin Johnson, Peter Strzok, FBIAgent Removed from Robert Mueller's Russia Probe,
Called Trump an 'Idiot', USA TODAY (Dec. 12, 2017, 7:15 AM), https://www.usato-
day.com/story/news/politics/2017/12/12/peter-strzok-fbi-agent-removed-muellers-russia-
probe-called-trump/946913001/.
105. To get a sense of the political fallout from this episode, see Tim Hains, DiGenova:
Strzok Texts Prove a "Brazen Plot" Inside FBI to Exonerate Clinton, Frame Trump, REAL
CLEAR POL. (Jan. 23, 2018), https://www.realclearpolitics.com/video/2018/01/23/digenova-a-
brazen-plot-inside fbi to exonerate clinton frame trump.html.
106. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
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most important role of potentially creating a national consensus
that President Trump should be removed if wrongdoing is shown. 
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But, partly, this weakness in the investigation is the result of how
it has been conducted. Simply put, the investigation has gone on
too long. A time limit for a report should have been set at the time
of the appointment.
With these lessons in mind, and considering the evaluations of
the models above, it is possible to imagine a hybrid model with a
combination of the best attributes of each.
What is needed is a new statute requiring an Attorney General
to appoint an Independent Counsel to investigate credible allega-
tions of wrongdoing by the President, or associates of the President,
that forbids any oversight of the resulting investigation, that gives
to the President an unfettered removal power and that results, in
addition to incidental criminal prosecutions of others, in a report to
Congress and the people about the alleged presidential wrongdoing
within a specified period-certainly no more than a year.
Under this hybrid model, the investigation could be relied upon
to commence and not to be viewed as controlled by the enemies of
the President, at least at the outset. Yet, as the investigation un-
folded, any criticism by the President of the conduct of the Inde-
pendent Counsel would be met with the response that the President
need only remove the Independent Counsel and should do so if war-
ranted.10 8 Of course, such a removal would subject the President o
grave suspicion and might prove politically unpalatable. This
would eventually force a President to drop the subject.
One can at least imagine that, under this structure, a report to
Congress of serious presidential wrongdoing might have a chance
of receiving a nonpartisan reception. Of course, the downside of
107. Polls show that half of Americans lack trust in the Mueller investigation. Susan Page
& Deborah Barfield Berry, Poll: Half ofAmericans Say Trump is Victim of a 'Witch Hunt' as
Trust in Mueller Erodes, USA TODAY (Mar. 18, 2019, 9:14 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/politics/20 19/03/18/trust-mueller-investigation-falls-half-americans-say-trump-
victim-witch-hunt/3194049002/.
108. The effect of a direct presidential removal power is shown by the winding down of the
story of removing Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein, who had appointed, and could
have removed, Mueller. Recently, President Trump considered removing Rosenstein, but
ultimately decided not to do so and the story ceased to be news. The President could not go
on criticizing Rosenstein simply because he could remove him if he had wanted to do so. The
same would be true if the President himself could remove Mueller. In that event, tweets like
the one at the beginning of this essay would eventually cease because the President himself
would have the power to stop the investigation. On November 7, 2018, Trump transferred
oversight of the Mueller investigation to acting US Attorney General Matthew Whitaker.





that advantage is that any report from such an Independent Coun-
sel exonerating the President would be sure to be discounted by the
President's political opponents as the product of an overly biased
and friendly investigating structure. But, as stated above, ferreting
out wrongdoing by a President, and removing such a President, is
more important to the future of American democracy than is exon-
erating a President who has been wrongly accused.
IV. CONCLUSION
In a sense, this essay is a thought experiment imaging a scenario
in which Americans might come together, fairly and rationally, to
decide a crucial political issue in a spirit of consensus. It imagines
an American political landscape that works. It will face two objec-
tions. One is that the investigatory model it proposes would fail to
actually work to discover presidential wrongdoing because it is
heavily structured in the President's favor. The reader will have to
judge whether that criticism is warranted. Admittedly, construct-
ing a model with a presidential bias was my intention from the be-
ginning.
The second objection will be that the underlying goal of creating
the possibility of a national consensus that a President has commit-
ted wrongdoing worthy of impeachment and removal is no longer
possible in this partisan, post-truth age. That conclusion I simply
cannot accept because it would mean the end of the American ex-
periment in constitutional self-government. I have faith in Amer-
ica. Therefore, if my effort to construct a model of investigating
presidential wrongdoing is flawed, what is needed is a more imagi-
native and insightful effort in the same vein. Failure is not an op-
tion.
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